I. INTRODUCTION
by \Ia~or Michael N Schmitt' and Captain Steven A. Hatfield'.
In courts-martial today. the use of a wide Tariety of scientific eridence has become routme. Counsel for either side may offer fingerprint or blood type emdence to indicate Identity. Trial counsel use chemical analysis of blood or urine to prove recent drug use or intoxication' Behm iorai analysis of victims is presented routinely as evidence of mpe trauma or battered child syndrome * Truthfulness.
or the lack thereof, theoreticallr can be demonstrated by PoIYRrBPh MILIT.4RI LAW- REI IEK' [mi 130 The use of other nexer types of scientific evidence someda) may become just as routine Apparentlg. scientists can now proie identit) 10 nearly a mathematical certainty using DNA analysis. ' The use of radioimmunoassa) maI)s1s of hair suggests that drug usage can be detecred for months. even years. after ingestion As science ad^ vances. ever more creative means of producing evidmce undoubredlg will be developed In recent years the standard for the adrnissibiln) of scientific evidence in courts-martial has undergone significant change This change can be described as the replacement of the general acceptance standard with the relevancy approach The purpose of this ar tick IS to examine the development and acceptance of the relexanc) approach in the federal and military courts. analyze its meaning, and attempt to provide a working model for its application in courtsmartial However, before turning to that approach an understanding of Its predecessor, the general acceptance standard. 1s necessan The underlying rationale for the general acceptance theory remains a consideration under the relevancy approach
THE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE TEST
Since 1023, the admisabiht) of nwel scientific eridence in federal. state, and military courts has been gowrned almost exclusively b) the rule articulated m Frye v Lhited States ' In that case the FedQral District C a m for the District of Columbia considered the admissibili~ ty of evidence derived from a crude forerunner of the pollgraph Whereas the modern polygraph measures several different physiolop cal responses of the subject being tested, the device under scrutiny in B y e was a "monograph:' which measured only blood pressure Finding the test to be a novel scientific technique, the court enunciated a standard of admissibility in a brief, two-page opinion that would provide a basic framework for the analysis of scientific evidence m the courts of The United States for the next sixty years.
That standard was announced as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discoT-ery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages 1s difficult to define. Somewhere ~n the twilight zone. the evidential farce of the principle must be recomized and while the C O U~ will go B long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from B well recognuzed scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction IS made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs.8
The court then held that the evidence in question was Inadmissible because the "lie detector" that was employed had "not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physmlogsal and psycholoacal authonties."n The &'rye court did not cite authority for the general acceptance standard, nor did the court set forth a rationale for It. Despite that fact, it was accepted initially without question. Only years later, when the standard was questioned, did courts began to defend its application in any comprehensive manner?" Several arguments in support of general acceptance were offered repeatedly. The most common basis for the test was the need to ensure the reliability of evidence upon which ajury based Its decision. The issue of reliability was, and still is, seen as especially important in the area of scientific evidence Although the judge or jury may have some innate ability to evaluate the testimony of lay witnesses, they probably do not h a w commensurate ability with regard to the complexities of science This relarive inability to assess critically scientific evidence LS compounded by a concern that science in the twentieth century, albeit ever more incomprehensible to the layman has taken on a n aura of "mystic infallibility."11 'Id at 1014 (emphass added) *id SIILITARY LAX REVIEK [\-"I 130 Thus. rhe pnmar) reason for requiring general acceptance by cx perts in the particular field to which the evidence belongs IS 10 address the potentid for confusion m the face of seeminglb infallible scientific evidence and to provide a method far determining its rehabilit> What the general acceptance standard does 1s supplant judges and la, juries with a 'scientific jury" when issues of sciennfic rellahihty a m e l i Thls approach is premised on the view that scientists are best able 10 abies5 science Assuming the particular e\idence passes muster in the scientific community. rhe fact finder need onl) determine the appiopriate weight to give the eiidencel' Weight issues fall aithin the natural pur because they center on concepts as credibil do most factual matters-on the effectiveness of litigators Thus ask-1ngjuror3 to handle such issues 1s consistent a-ith all the other tasks the judicial system demand? of them. Additional justificationc for the R y e test include ensuring the exisfenr? of a 'reserve nf experti who can crit~rally examine the \alidity of a scientific determmation m a pamcuiar case and promoting ' uniformit) of deciiion ' I"
The Frya standard received almost unirenal acceptance although application of the standard is not without problems For instance some scientific evidence cannot he ascribed conrm~ently TO a particular field of stud? to determine acceptance because the evidence may be the product of an mterdiacqlinary approach \lust iuch evidence he accepted generally by all scientific fields That contributed to Lt S exlstence"l6
Perhaps an eien more troublingissue raised by the general acccp tame approach 1s ahether it 15 the principle or the technque employed in the creation of the scientific evidence that must be accepted generally!' A review of the Fry@ decision reieals that the court was concerned almost exclusively w t h the pnnc~ple mvoived. Specifically, it found no genera!& accepted nexus between vanations m blood pressure and deceptionLB In subsequent years, however, many courts deviated from the precise holding in Frye and required general acceptance of the technique employing the Other controverxes ansmg as a result of the failure of the Frye court to provide a comprehensive analytical framework include the defmitmn of the term how narrowly or broadly the relevant field from which general acceptance is sought 1s to be defined.21 what is necessary to quahf?. as an expert,zZ and how general acceptance 1s t o be proven
FRYE RECONSIDERED
-4s previously noted, Frye was accepted initially without questmn. As time passed, however, the general acceptance standard came Theterm pnnclple appberfathe raentifx d e s ortheanerrelled upoonb) xienfistsin deielopingfhe evidence Theferm ' technique refersfofhemeans b) nhich the principle is applied For inslan~e poligraphy is based on the pmciple that con. icmus deception came3 phyaalo~cal sties that can be meaured The actual measurement of the ohvsioloacal chanleS bu the m l i m a o h lrielf and the formulatinn of an To compound this lack of guidance, the Advisory Committee's Notes did not address the issue of whether the general acceptance standard survived promulgation of the rules.2e The significance of these omissions would soon become apparent to scholars and practitioner? alike. Was the standard so accepted as to be assumed part and parcel of Federal Rule of Evidence 702,30 or did the ommion indicate that the judicial standard set forth had been overruled l e @~l a t i v e l s~~~ The foundation was laid for a schism in evidentiary law that continues today reject 11 in faior of a less demanding approach That approach ha, away with the treatment of notel e\ldenie aa a sepalate dard marked a retreat 10 the pre-F~ye era of adrniiiihility Rrlerancy wa, a rcrurn tc, hasica-argualil?. d return of fact-finding to the nceptb such as prohatire \ d u e pre hould now sene to ihape thp ad missibility mquir? Ih This 15 not to iuggeir that thebe concepti plased no role in the general accepranre analysis However they were n m to emerge from the hackpound to supplanr the nonlegalisric inquiriei of the ' m m r i f i c j u r ) " '~ SCIEKTIFIC ETIDEUCE would quickly become the lead case cited by relevancy advocates The fact pattern of Dou,ning is fascinating At issue in this fraud case was whether the defendant was a con man who had calied hunself "Reverend Claymore" Twelbe eyewitnesses testified that the defendant and Reverend Claymore were one and the same. The defense called an expert witness on the unreliahilit? of eywitness testimony Relying on the "helpfulness standard of Federal Rule of Endence 702,38 the Third Circuit refused to permit the defense expert to take the stand.
Lkited States 2.
A re?iew of Doznzny indicates that the coum was primed to reject Frye by relying on the text of the Federal Rules As the D w ntng coun recognized. the eight years since the promulgarion of those ruies had wnnessed a plethora of suggestions on how novel scientific evidence should be treated Among the possible approaches CIIculating at the time were the following reasonahie scientific accep t a n~e . '~ a preponderance standard for cnrnmal defendants a i t h a beyond a reasonabie doubt standard for prosecutor^,^^ established and recognized accuracy and reliability.'2 and a relevancy prejudm approach that shifts the inquir) to weight once relevancy 1s established Rather than adopting one of the new approaches that had become the focus of attention. however, the court chose to fashion Its own analysis of the mies This LS not to iuggest that the court rejected the v a~i o u i alternatives out of hand Instead it noted the underlying considerations of those approaches and then looked to the Federal Rules of Evidence for resolution of the dispute Indeed. even the Fvye standard played ~o m e role m the couTt's new approach.
For the Third Circuit, the derivation of an appropriate standard necessarily was rooted in the broadness of the relevancy rules-Federal Rules of E\idence 101~403 Cnder the rules. essentially all evidence 1s admissible unless I t 1s irrelevant, undulr prejudicial. or SlILIT.4RY LAW-REL-IEW [V"l 130 otherwise specifically excluded.4i Bg contrast. evidence evaluated using the Frye standard could be excluded even if It was both rele vant and not prejudicial This would occur in situations m whlch the scientific CommUniTy had nor get passed collectne judgement on the process Involved Reduced to basics. the two approaches represent an inherent conflict between the search for truth and the goal of fairness m our legal system If the goal is truth. then evidence havmg any hearing on the fact in issue should be adrnisnble so long as it IS not so unreliable as to grossly mislead the facr finders The broadness of the relevancy rules clearly fosters this goal. J u s t m is safeguarded through litigation as to The appropnate welght to be w e n the evidence On the other hand. the F v e approach searches for fairness Uimg the F?y.yp approach, courts are w-illing to sacrifice evidence that might he dispositive so as to preclude any possibht) that unfalr--l.e.. Scientificall) unrehahle-eiidence might come before the fact finders The safeguard 1s to be found in science, not law As a result, the scientific jur, takes center stage. and Iitigatmn focuses on admissibility Thus, a natural conflict exists hetween the central premise of rhe relevancy rule5 and that of Interestmgly the court could have avoided the apparent conflict between relevant) and Frye simply by holding that. given the failure of the Federal Rule of Evidence drafters to ' overrule" spec~f~call: the general acceptance standard, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 111~ corporated Frye Again this would have been inconsistent w r h the .'Fed R Eiid 401 Releiam eiidence nieani an) eiidence haiing an) fendencj to make the existence of am fact that 1% of consequence 10 the defemination of the broad nature of Federal Rules of Evidence 401-403. However, the drafters arguably contemplated this inconsistency by noting that evidence admissible under the relevancy rules nevertheless may be excluded by the terms of other rules of e v i d e n~e .~' In light of the asserted dangers of "mystic infallibility" posed by novel scientific evidence, a detour from the pnncipie favoring admissibility might have been justified. After all, truth 1s most often the victim of unfairness. Thus. the broadness of relevancy logically did not demand the death of Frye.
Rather than arguing that Frye had been rejected outri@.t, the Doz~ning court took a umque approach by concluding that, although the codification of eiidence rules "may counsel m faror of a reexamination of the general acceptance standard;'4s Federal Rule of Evidence 702 neither incorporated nor repudiated Frge This very unusual analysis was based on the theory that because the draftem must have been aware that Frye was ajudicml creation. the failure to condemn ''such Intentniai judicial ruie-making"4g in the rules was to be read as a mere invitation to reconsider the In other words, the Third Circuit was suggesting that drafters intended the courts to address the LSSW in a case-by-case fashion The flaw in this analysis lies in the nature of the drafters task If they had been ~n the process of drafting nonbinding rules, deferring decision on particular issues to the courts of differtngjurisdictions might have made more sense. However, the draften were developing binding rules for an integrated system of courts. Nevertheless, the Downing court seemed to be suggesting that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence were willing t o countenance splits among federal courts in their approaches to novel scientific emdence If the development of rules of evidence was to be left to the judiciary. one must wonder why the drafters bothered to take on their task in the first place. Was piecemeal Uniformity satisfactory to them? Surely, this would represent an unusual method of codification Arguabiy, the Dozn ing court was inviting reconsideration-not the drafters. Xievertheless, given the court's interpretation of the omissions, the msue of Frye's survival entered the realm of judicial policymaking With poiicy concerns now the focus of attention. the court began its inquiry into the relative merits of mamtaimng the B y e standard.
'-Fed K €\id 402 m e mpm note 45 ' V 6 3 F9d 81 1236 "Id Inld Far B discussion of the background under1:lng the effort to produce a uniform ret ofevldentlars wdelmes. see S Salfzburg and K Redden. lupm note 30 $6 1-6 MILITARY L.4W' REVIEU jVd 1311
On the posmve side, Fry? provides a methodolag) h? whlch novel scientific evidence ma? be assessed, that is. "the scienrific jury Theoretically. this method would result in like decisions in like cases and therefore serve the goal of uniformity ofjudgment At the same time. general acceptance also protects criminal defendanrs from unreliable evidence presented b? the prosecutmn to a p r i potentiall) in awe of science Counterbalancing these advantages are two significant poientlal dangers The first 1s "iagueness" As the court pointed out the general acceptance standard IS vague because the terms 'srlentlflc community" and "general acceptance are Ill-defined Even lf the courts could reach a consensus as to the compmtmn of rhe rele van1 cammunit?" regarding a particular farm of sclentlflc etldence the iengthy and divisive process of reaching consens~s would he revisited each time a ne= scientific process was deidoped. .it the same rime the subjectiiity inherent m the r e m general a c c e p~ tance' precludes an? quantification of the standard The second danger cited by the courl 1s Conseriaturn " As the coun perceptively pointed out the standard 1s conservative in the sense that it might preclude the admission of probative and reliable etidence 5a Because of the lag time between the development of a neh type of scientific evidence and it5 general acceptance b? the scientific community. Frye clearly has the potential of excluding e~idence that subsequently LS determined to be completel? rehabie Arguably. this IS a neutral flaw that 15, one that might assist rhe guilty defendant to keep inculpatory evidence out and assist the gorernment to exclude evidence of an exculpatov nature.54 Neutral or not. however, if trials are forums in which truth 1s sought, that purpose .
. .
no,% comicred defendant will be hindered 5 5 These two concerns-vagueness and conserratism-led the court to reject Frye as "an independent controlling standard of admissibdit)-"S6 Instead. general acceptance was viewed as but one of potencially many indicators af reliabiiny.57
In what has become the accepted approach by courts rejecting B y e , including the military courts. the Third Circuit set forth its method of determmmg whether evidence 1s admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 The key was the term "helpfulness" m the rule. For the court, an assessment of whether novel scientific evidence is heipful depends on three factors 1) the soundness and reliability of the process or technique used in generating the evidence, 2) the possibility that admitting the evidence wauid orerwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and 3) the proffered connection between the scientific research or test result to be presented. and the particular disputed factual ISSUBS m the case j S
The simbnt)-between this three-tiered query and the relevancy rules leaves one with the impression that the court has done more than reject Frye Arguably, che court has defined Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as a restatement of the relevancy rules. For example. with regard t o the f i n t component of the test, mould evidence resulting from an unreliable or unsound technique or process make a fact m issue more or less probable under Federal Rule of Evidence 401n Clearly. it would not One possible resolution of this quandary is an argument thar the question in Federal Rule of Ewdence 401 is not whether the process or technique is unreliable. but simply a h e t h e r the result that 1s generated maker the fact in issue more or less probable In other wards, accurate. albeit unrehable. evidence that makes a fact in issue more or less like15 is admissible under The Third Circuit clearly was iensitite to rhe oossibhtr that its interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence i 0 2 was illogical in hght of the Federal Rules of E\ideiice 101 403 relevant) itandards It therefor? n e n t to some effort to distinguish the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requirements The court sraned by construing the term "helpfulness ' (Federal Rule of Evidence 702 standard) as necessanly implying a quantum of reliahilir) "beyond that required to meet a standard of bare logical relevance (Federal Rule of Evidence 401). ' M Unfortunately m the absence of quantification 01 examples, this clarification does little other than muddy the water Indeed. it smacks of meaningless judicial draftsmanship 61 In a like manner, the court acknowledged that the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 concern about confusmg, misleading or overwhelmmg ebidence might mirror Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to some extent. The court posits P \ Idence. however, that could meet the 
SCIESTIFIC EYIDENCE
Despite adoption of the Mhtary Rules of Evidence a n 12 \larch l&B0,fi3 the m d n a v couns continued to employ the Frye test ~n generail? the ~a m e manner as them c w h a n counterparts6' As the Federal Rules of Evidence did in federal courts. however, the Military Rules of Evidence eventually would provide the impetus for a complete revision in the admissibility standards applicable to novel scientific evidence This should not be surprising. aien the clear goal of the draften of the military rules to mirror the federal rules to the extent possible 6 b A~ aresult oftharmtent, the rulesrelevant to thls that "in the absence of any definitive authority to the contrary, [it was] u n w i h g to abandon a rule that has been applied VI the mllitary for almost thirty years"'O Presumably, the appropriate authority would be a decision by the Court of Military Appeals.
The Bothwell court was obviously uncomfortable n i t h the 'it's always been done that way justification I t had enunciated. In an effort to bolster its holding the court turned to the "mptic mnfaUbhtg" rationale set forth nine years earlier by the D C Circuit Court in United States ii Addison in other words, the Bothwell court was expressing concern that lay members very well mighr be overwhelmed by the scientific nature of the evidence and that unfairness would resuit At the same time, the court "erg perceptively realized that critics might allege that the danger of misleading or overwhelmmg the jury already was taken care of by the !vlhrary Rule of Evidence 403 balancing test. Therefore. its interpretation of Military Rule of Evidence 702 as incorporating *ye to avoid such dangers wauid clearly be subject t o attack. To preempt that cntLcism, the court declared the Frye protection to be 5 e a t e r than that of Military Rule of Evidence 103 and based its argument on the wards "substantially outweighed" in the rule.'2 Clearly. in retrospect the apparent hidden agenda of the Bothuell court was GO invite others tojoin the affrayv3 Until that occurred, however, the Bothiiell court was unwilling to explore new g o u n d Thus, Frye would remain the accepted standard admission of rebuttal evidence bg a chdd psychmtnst concernmg sexual abuse. the court noted the existence of "a sufficient body of specialized knowledge' as to the typical behavior of sexually abused children and their families to permit certain conclusions LO hr drawn by an expen."'5 Though such verbiage resembles general acceptance. that standard uas not discussed by the court This fact. combined with the earlier comment an admissibility. indicated the court %ai moving slowly m the direction of the relevancy approach Kot long after S n~p e s .
the Court of 4lilitar3 Appeals moved even closer to adoption of the relevancy approach m Cnzted States z .Wwtaja '8Mustustaja was a rape~murder case in which the government called an Army Criminal InveitlgaKion Command (CID) agent to testify concerning blood flight analysa. The defense objected on the grounds that blood flight analysis was not general15 accepted Without addressing the issue direct11 the court found the existence of "a body of specialized knowledge which would permit a properlg trained person to draw conclu~ion~ as to the source of the blood The court, discussing the effect on B y e and the general acceptance standard only peripherally, found Khat the emtence of this bad) of specialized knowledge meant the evidence was "helpful. ,.e., relevant Thus, it was admissible Bo Though certiorari was denied on Though the Court of hIilitary Appeals did not label their new approach to novel scientific evidence. the requirements iist?d above are nearly identical to those set forth by commentators and courts adrocatmg what has become known ai the "rele Lts pure form the relevancy approach treats novel s as any other type of evidence by asking whether the evidence 1s probative and, 11 so, whether its probative value outweighs the dangers posed by
Arguably. both Dounrng and Gtpsoii requir? further evaluation of the evidence usmg the expert restman) rule Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or Militan Rule of Evidence 702 AS discussed some question exists as to uhether those rules are simply restatements of the relevancg rules or whether the? a r~ qualitatirel) differem Regardless of the academic exercise of dif-ferentiating between the relevancy and expert testimony rules, however, both the Downing and Oipson courts treated them as different Therefore. any proposal of practical use will do likewise.lo7
With the adoption of the relevancy approach by the military courts. practitioners now are faced S i t h a significantly different mode of analysis when determining the potential admissibility of scientific evidence. This article will propose an analytical framework to use with regard to that emdence. First, however, one must clearly understand the rules used in the analysis. Military Rules of Evidence 401. 402, 403, and i O 2 .
VI. MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE 401 AND 402
Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides that all relevant evidence 1s admissible unless otherwise provided by the Constmtmn, the Manual for Courts-Martial, or Acts of Therefore one must turn to the definition of relevant evidence under Militan Rule of Evidence 401 to ascertain admissibility. Basically. releiant eiidence is that which has any tendency to make a fact in ISSUB more or less probable'os Evidence that does so is deemed loacaily relevant Determining whether or not the evidence 1s logically relevant 1s essentialiy a tiered inquiry consisting of materialit) and probativeness To be material. the widence must bear on an issue in the CPEB. If It does not, it E Immaterial and. thus, cannot be relevant Assuming the evidence in question is material. an inquiry into whether It actually makes the Issue more or less probable LS required. If the evidence makes the issue more probable, It 1s probative and the ewdence is fher reamn than the nmelti hould meet most of there to quantify rehabihty beyond stating that Military Rule of Evidence 702 aould require a "greater quantum of reliability Than That required by the dictate of lo@cal r e l e > a n~y "~ Hair much greater IS not clear .4t the same rime. Gipsnn failed to set forth what 1s supposed to be rel~able"~ As a result. weight admisnbihry dlsrlncrloris remain blurred.
In fairness, the Gzpsnn court did provide some assmance to those who would applg 11s neu standard, although ~romcallg in the farm of Frye. Despite Fry& rejection as The "be-all-end-all standard. the Court of Slilitarg Appeals held that general acceptance remained a factor for consideration by courts. both as to the issue of probativeness (Rule 401) and That of helpfulness (Rule iO?)ll'Therefor?. if evidence passes muster under the old F~y e mndard. LT should generally s u r v m a Gipson re\ieir"' Military Review m Eothwell.LL' Though that court retained Frye, it set forth the areas of reliability it felt Military Rule of Evidence 401 affected. In determining reliability of scientific evidence. the court suggested an inquiry into three factors 1) the validity of the prmclple underlying the technique used, 2 ) the validity of the technique itself; and 3) the proper application of the technique on the particular O C C~S L O~ that resulted in generation of the evidence119 As in Gtpson. the lack of quantifmtmn LS one problem posed by the suggested methodoiogy Additionaiiy, remember that Eothxell 1s technically nothing more than periuasne authority Xeuertheleas, the case does provide some semblance of merhodological order for courts s t r u aing through the imprecision of G~pspson
The case also can serve as a framework for developing an argument on the issue of admissibilit) vemus weight In that Eothrell calis for a review of the entire scientific process. from principle to application, one can argue that the admisstbility weight distinction 1s one of degee, not of subject matter. when considering navel scientific evidence. For example, the question 1s not whether concerns about a principle will fail within the purview of the judge as the finder of the law or the members as the fmder of the fact Instead. the issue IS whether the concerns have reached a level at which the judge, as a matter of laxv. wili refuse to allow the jury to consider the evidence The process of defining reliabihty m a usable way 1s difficult In the effort to determine the limits of inquirg. even reliance on the well-reasoned Bothwell decision leaves one foundering, for subjectivity pervades the entire process. Though law LS cenainlg no stranger to subjectivity, that which exists in making rehability determmmons poses particular difficulty The standard does e m t , however, and the three Bothwell Inquiries wiil assist litigators and the judiciary to address the issue with a semblance of coherence
VII. MILITARY RULE OF EVIDENCE 702
Assuming scientific evidence meets the requirements of Niiitary Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, it then must be analyzed against a much greater indication of whar it meant by the term than it had u h e n discussing Military Rule of Evidence 101 Basically. the tesr 1s "helpfulneis" to the fact finder 111' that IS. an indication that the court lo@cally concluded that unreliable evidence 1s unhelpful This assumption led to the court's articulation of three factors that must be balanced when determining helpfulness As noted earlier in Gipson the Court of Militar3 Appeals adopted the Downing court's analysis of helpfulnessL22 Militar) courts now w~l l be required to evaluate the soundness and reliability of the process 01 technique; the possLbilit) of misleading. overwhelming, or confusing the jury. and the extent of the connection berueen the eiidence and the disputed factual I S S U~.~~~ Obviously the5e aspects again presenr the problem of quanaficarion In other words, the imp r e c~m n m distmguishing between admissibilit) and weight issues remains Unfortunately the court did little to resolve the issue beyond noting that a greater degree of reliability will be required than m a Military Rule of Evidence 401 ~n q u i r y ?~~ The weight versus admissibdity issue is. therefore. both a Militar) Rule of Evidence 702 and a Rule 401 issue Presumably, the trialjudge will be able to decide when the controversy over reliability IS severe enough to merit t a k~ mg the mue from the jury entirely by ruling the evidence madmissi-bled<
In setting forth the first tier of B Military Rule of Eiidence 702 ln quxy the Gzpspson court neglected 10 discuss what It meant by soundness and reliability of the technique or process Though such an omission normally s a u l d be fatal in the attempt to develop an analytical methodology the near total reliance of the court on the Downmg decision can be used to flesh out the definition. Percewing the problems courts might encounter m assessing rehability, the Third Circuit set forth a number of facton that might be considered Fin1 and foremost IS the degree of acceptance of the technique or process12B In essence, this is a quasi-Frye analysis Certainly, if a technique or Process has gained general acceptance in the scientific community, It IS probably reiiabie On the other hand, the Dmning court notes that "a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within the community is likely to be found unreiiable"'2' The gey area between 'general acceptance" and "minimal support" requires further elucidation
To flesh out the grey area, Downzng suggests a number of tactics Beyond acceptance. a court may consider the umqueness or novelty of a technique or process. In other words, given a novel scientific technique. to what extent IS It based on established and well-accepted principles? Similarly. the technique or process may have been critiqued in literature from the relevaant field of study. In both these cases the key is the extent to which the "scientific basis of the new technique has been subjected to critical scientific scrutiny:'126 Other factors that might be addressed include the "qualifications and prafessionai stature of the witnesses;' the "non-judicial uses to which the scientific techmque are put," "the frequenq with which a technique leads to an erroneous results;'128 and the 'type of error"130 generated Of course. a court always could choose to take judicial nonce of testimony supporting or attacking the technique in prior cases.131
The Gipson decision also provided little guidance on how to ascertain whether the evidence would overwhelm, confuse, or rnnlead the members. particularly in light of the hlilitarg Rule of Evidence 403 hmitatmnr. Again by focusing on the Doumzng decision. however. one at least can sense the type of issues the courts would address. Obviously, one danger IS the Addison ' mystic mfallibilit>"132 can-~e r n l~~ In noting this problem. the Dou,nrng court ciearlg feir the need to address the concerns of those u ho opposed rejection of Frye Frye was meant in great part to avoid the "m)stic mfallihility of scientific evidence ~n the eyes of the layman The Douning court's alteranan of the standard of admissibility mas no reason to assum this problem aould vanish?3+ Therefore, the relevancy test does tackle the problem through a tier of the ne~r-I) articulated 702 inquiry To the extent a piece of scientific eiidence wrlll generate u n~ due credibility and be afforded undue weight bg the fact fmder a m p Iy because of Its scientific nature, the evidence IS more likely to be deemed inadmissible when the probative versus prejudlclai balancing occurs
The irony IS that this approach simply restructures the Frye response to the problem. Under Frye. those best able t o assess the ewdence would pass judgment on Its admissibility. If Icss than general11 accepted evidence meets the first tier of the Rule i o 2 analysis under Doit ntrig Gipson (soundness and rehabdit? 1. houerer the propensty to mislead or confuse 1s compounded b) the "mystic mfallibiliry" phenomena because the evidence LS less reliable than L aould have been under Frye La5cally less reliable evidence poses greater dangers a i misleading. confusing, or m e n helming the fact finder The unanswered question is, of course. how the balance play5 itself out Would more evidence be inadmissible based an lack of general acceptance under Fry? than would he 11 based on confusion under the relevancy test. gren the lesser degree of acceptance that test requires? That remains to be seen TU.0 additional potential scenarios are singled out in Downing as posing particular dangen The greater danger involves the offer of conclusmns b) the expert wtiiess without a Critical assesrmenr of the underlying data135 In rhese cases, the expert series as his own "scientific jury" and propounds his own ewJuation of the accurac) of the evidence This is problematic because. under the reIeIaiic) srandard, the rask of demonstrating reliability IS less onerouS The 198 F2d ai ill see s u p 0 note 11 and accornpa Dniincng 753 F2d at 1238 Indeed, the absence of experts terrif)mg that the ed ma) exacerbate the perceived problem of m 'DV63 F3d at 1239 proponent no longer needs to present the "ruling" of the ''rcientific jury" prior t o a d m~s s i o n ?~~ Instead, h e need only convince the judge, a layman m the field of science
The second problem cited m Downing is that of subjectivity As the court noted, scientific evidence often is generated in raw form by mechamcal devices Then the duty of the expert is to evaluate the evidence s u b j e~t i v e l y ?~~
The classic example, of course, 1s found m polygraphy. Again, subjectivity IS a 5 e a t e r danger under the relevancy test than under B y e because the process by which the expert subjectweh evaluates the data undergoes less scrutiny Therefore, ~n the absence of strict scrutiny of the process, there exists a significant potential for subjectivit) flaws in a relevancy approach to 702
Once the court has considered the degree of reliability and the potential to confuse, mislead, or overwhelm. it must balance the twoLBB I n h w n i x g the Third Circuit purposefully declined to enunciate the foundation for doing so It reasoned that because a balancing test that had poiicy implications was being employed. imposing a standard as if the process involved only fact-finding would be inappropriate Instead, I t simply would use an abuse of discretion stan- dard to revmv the decisions of l a~-e r C D U~~S~~~ In other nordi the trial judge will have l o ascertain when the balance giren the par ticular type of evidence involved and in light of other eiidence ad duced at trial, will tip in faxor of adinissibilitr or m favor of exclusion Presumably. rnilitar? courts will lake the same approach.
If the reliability of the evidence outweighs the potential dangers, the court must consider the final factor implicit in Milltar! Rule of Evidence 702-the proffered connection between the offered evidence and the fact in This ISSUP 1s remmscent of the Military Rule of Evidence 401 requirement that the evidence render a fact of "consequence more or less probable""' Generally artlcuiatmg the connection will not he an orerly demanding task for the practmoneP2 Further. because reliability already 15 descrihed as a Rule 702 requirement, the issue actually wlii he one of materialik tSLa3 Therefore, assuming rhe reliability of eridence outneighs its lQQO] SCIEKTIFIC EVIDEKCE dangen. the proponent need show only that it will help the fact finder resolve a disputed
VIII. MILITARY RULE OF EVIDENCE 403
The last requirement under a Gipson relevancy analysis is that the probative value not be "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the ISSUBS. or rnisleadmg the members, or by undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence 'M In assessing the balance, the presumption is in favor of admissibihty. Furthermore, the judge will be 5 a n t e d a g e a t deal of discretion in making this determmation I4O Many of the issues discussed above with regard t o the hlilirary Rule of Evidence 702 focus on these dangers are also relevant here As pointed out above. however, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is considered, at least in the Third Circuit, to be a stricter standard than the Rule io2 standard;" a precedent mhttary courts probably wiil follow w e n the averail 
IX. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A oipsor~ analpla of norel scientific evidence clearl) IS fraughr with pitfalls The primary problem is the lack of quantification and defmitmn of the standard, Beyand adoption of a different rtandard.li2 little can be done to address this particular problem because the criteria chosen by the court mherentl) call for SubJectlrIr). Therefore oractitloners must r e l r onmanlr on thmr adrocarv akills . . dunng ddmimbility hearings and must cise their broad discletion w~s e l s -'~ tT"St that Judge: 11.111 exrr-A more approachable problem 1s that the standard fails 10 offer a paint-by-poinr catalogue of the issues the court will addrear In other words, issues tend to iepeat themsrlver m the guise of criteria for Larylng rules of evidence For exampl?. reliability 1s the subject af m q u q in both a Military Rule of Eiidence 401 and a >lilitary Rule of Evidence 702 analysis The same 1s true of the hiilltar> Rules of Evidence 403 and 702 confusing. misleading. or o\erwhelrning dangers Even acceptmg the court's articulated distmcriona the substantwe elements of these two examples remain consrant from rule to rule Those distinctions that do exist are merely ones of degree Keiertheless, the similarities permlt proposal of a cohesive methodology for the practitioner that combines components of the various rules Of course, combining common elements of different rules of evidence will not be responsive IO the differences of degree asserted by bath Downing and Gipspson. However. in the absence of clear guidance concerning what those differences are, this point is, in practical terns. irreievant. Judges wlll base them decisions on their own estimation of whether the standards have been met, ciring the more restrictive rule m close cases Although this analysis may sound overly cynical. actually it IS simply a recognition of the existence of judicial discretion
In the aftermath of Downzng and Gipson. certain areas of inquiry emerge that cut across the somewhat hair process that would exist in a rule by rule analysis. The analytical framework set forth below is offered to help the pracntloner organize an approach to novel scientmc e\ idence No relevancy analysis would be complete rnthout considering each of the following points:
1)
To what extent does the witness qualify as an expert by virtue of his or her knowledge. skill, experience. trammg. or education (Military Rule of Evidence i02)?
2) To what extent LS the offered evidence connected or material to the fact in issue (Milnary Rules of ELidence 401 and 7021?
3) How valid are the principles underlying the technique used to generate the evidence (Milnary Rules of Evidence 401 and 702)?
4)
How valid LS the technique or process used to generate the evidence (Military Rules of Evidence 401 and 702]? 5 ) To whar extent was the apphcanon of the process or technique as to this particular evidence and in this particular instance proper (Military Rules of EIidence 401 and 702)'' 6) To x hat extent will admission af the evidence oierwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and what is the balance between these fac- With the exception of the final question. each inquiry requires an answer that must be placed along a continuum This was done purposefull? to emphasize the discretionaq powers of the JUdlClaq in this area The practitioner also must realize that the answers to there questions probably will have a synerastic effect an the ultimate exercise of that discretion!j' Regardless of the way discretion p1.q~ itself out, howmer, a complete anal)rii of proffered novel scientific evidence must respond to each of these questions. Finall) the relevancy approach provides fertile ground for argument that an? problems with scientific widence Identified by the above anal) tical framework should go to the weight of the eiidence. not to its ad missihility. As mentioned prevmurl??66 the assumption thar jurors cannot deal critically with scientific eqidence map be unwarranted especially m courts-martial In fact. jurors in a court-martial actually may be better able than the Judge to assess some types of scientific evidence With this in mind. an advocate might argue that the relevancy approach. with Its less restnctiw pasture towards scientific evidence demands thar the members be permitted to assign the appropriate weight to a piece of evidence. and that the judge should refuse to admit scientific evidence only under very rare circumstances
X. CONCLUSION
From 1923 to the mmd 1980 s the admissibility of scientific evidence in most courts of the United States including courts-martial, was governed by the general acceptance standard This standard required that the scientific principle and technique involved in rhe creation of a certain piece of evidence he accepted generally by the field to which the princLpie belonged Recently. the relevancy approach which appears to he far less restrictive has been adopted by some federal C O U~I E and the milirary C O U T~S . Whether or not the relevdiicy approach actually will create a less restrictive atmosphere for the reception of scientific evidence m courts-martial remains t o be seen In adopting t h e relevancy approach, the Court of Military Appeals did not articulate clear, quantifiable standards for its apphcatmn. Although a d e g e e of uncertainty e m t s with regard to the appiication of the relevancy approach, as forensic science becomes mcreasingly more sophisticated, the standard certainly will receive further critical attention, and clearer standards necessarily w-111 result
